The Kyoto Defacto...
The Kyoto
Protocol is an international agreement set by the ‘United Nations’ (“UN”) to
tackle the issue of Global warming (www.unfccc.int). The protocol has been
signed by over 40 ‘industrialised’ nations and since 1997 a series of meeting
have taken place on setting targets to reduce the amount of greenhouse gases
being release to the environment. This paper will use Realism – an, ‘International
Relations’ (“IR”) theory - to assess the issue of global warming and will in
particular focus on the global governance of the Kyoto protocol. It will use
the Realist perspective to assess the current developments and will consider
the potential future outcome of the Kyoto Protocol.
To
successfully assess the Kyoto Protocol from a Realist perspective, this paper
will first, justify the application of Realist theory in context to the Kyoto
Protocol by providing an overview of the importance of IR theory and Realism.
Second, The Realist perspective will be used as a framework to assess the Kyoto
Protocol. Third, a prediction on the future outcome of the Kyoto Protocol from
a Realist perspective shall be outlined. Fourth, it will critically assess
whether the Realist perspective is in fact a sustainable perspective to gain a
better understanding of the Kyoto Agreement. Finally, this paper will argue
that Realism provides a useful analysis of the Kyoto agreement and in turn
identifies serious flaws in the way States behave within the Kyoto Protocol and
needs to be worked through to tackle global warming; however the theory comes
short by not providing workable solution.
It is
accepted by experts and academics, IR theory plays a significant part in trying
to understand the complex relationship between people, states and power in the
world. According to Nicholson (1998,
p.8) by understanding these elements it is then possible to predict future
events.
The ability
of a theory to explain and predict the future is what determines the ‘strength
of the theory’. Other factors that give gravitas to IR theory is determined by
“how well it can explain behaviour…”( www.princeton.edu)
The Realist
perspective is considered to be one of the driving forces in IR and respected as
a workable perspective in order to gain understanding of IR behaviour [Source].
In this context the realist theory should be able to provide an understanding
of the Kyoto agreement.
According to
Sutch & Elias (p, 43) the Realist perspective provides an understanding of
the ‘conviction’ of the decisions taken by a state. In addition, the realist
perspective allows an intimate understanding of state behaviour, including, the
statecraft, security and configuration of power (Sutch & Elias, p43). By
using the Realist perspective to assess the Kyoto Protocol should therefore
provide an understanding of the way States are behaving and the potential
future outcomes of the protocol.
According to
John J Mearsheimer, the Realist belief is based around a ‘body’ of theories
that share common beliefs. The fundamental belief is based on the assumption
that ‘states are the principle actors in
world politics’ (Sutch & Elias, p.43). This would mean any decisions taken
within The Kyoto agreement would be interdependent of each State, rather
than any other potential factors (http://unfccc.int). Then it would seem logical to think, If the
state is the ‘principle’ decision maker, it seems inept, for any state to
influence another state to abide to any Global warming initiatives. Instead,
the initiative would need to advocate incentives for a State to be involved.
The Kyoto
protocol seems to establish a form of incentive through the Carbon trading
initiative that allows states to trade its carbon in the form of credits. That a
state can then use to offset any carbon that it may feel unable to reduce.
The Realist theory focuses on
‘power relations between states’ to effectively deliberate on international
affairs matters (Sutch & Elias, p.42). The term ‘power’ used within the
realist sphere is determined by two factors, economical or military. In other
words, the amount of power a state influences, the amount it is able to
leverage in a given agreement and adjudicate upon itself and other states. In this respect, although Kyoto Protocol is
primarily focused on tackling the environment, the behaviour of states and the
level of involvement will in effect be shaped by the scale of the states
economy and military capabilities.
The
Realist perspective of power certainly provides interesting observation within
the Kyoto Protocol. There appears to be strong evidence, that wealthier states have
increased leverage with the direction of the Kyoto Protocol. For example, the EU and Australia
lead the Kyoto agreement in terms of the legal and policy framework, yet they
represent less than 15% of global greenhouse gas emission. According to a
recent UNEP report, the largest Greenhouse producers in the world, Russia,
China and the USA produce 40% of the world Greenhouse emissions (http://www.unep.org/pdf/2012gapreport.pdf). However, according to
the UNEP report these states are not bound to any commitment to reducing their
emissions, while other less emitting states are bound to targets. The realist
perspective expound these states are able to exercise such autonomous behaviour
due to their economically and militarily strength.
This can be clearly seen by, both China and
the USA, who are the fastest growing economies in the World. China for example
has ‘the fastest growing economy for past thirty years’ in addition to the
third or fourth largest nuclear arsenal in the world (Herd, 2010, p.137). Both
of these states produce the largest amounts of CO2, yet both are not bounded to
any legal agreements.
Waltz explains for the Realist perspective, States indulgence for power derives from the need to ‘act only for self-interest with primary goal of own security, sovereignty and survival’ (www.aiu.edu). China or USA adhering to its own-interest is very apparent. By acting in this way both states seem to be protecting its own security, sovereignty and survival.
Other developed
nations manipulating the formulation of policies set within the Kyoto protocol
for sovereign reason also seem apparent. The UK for example, was able to ‘easily meet its Kyoto target’ by
cutting its domestic carbon dioxide emissions by 23 per cent from 1990 levels
by 2011. But several assessments of its total carbon footprint - including emissions produced from the
manufacture of imported goods - reveal an increase of around 10 per cent since
1990, even allowing for the
recent economic downturn (www.newscientist.com). This ‘self interest’ behaviour provides a strong
example of more developed States being able to manipulate the policy to gain a
competitive advantage. These states are for example, able to use easily
accessible energy sources e.g. oil, coal, in doing so they are not required to
invest large amounts in building new emission friendly energy sources or impose
policies restricting industry to operate.
Although, It would be easy to flaunt doubt over the Kyoto agreement if ‘power’ is used as a benchmark to assess the success of the Kyoto Protocol. The inequality of power is substantiated within the Realist perspective, as Hobbes defines it as a “key features of world politics”(cited, Sutch & Elias, p.45). Arguably, the thematic of more powerful states dictating international policy upon less powerful states does seem to be a normal phenomenon in the realms of global politics.
Although, It would be easy to flaunt doubt over the Kyoto agreement if ‘power’ is used as a benchmark to assess the success of the Kyoto Protocol. The inequality of power is substantiated within the Realist perspective, as Hobbes defines it as a “key features of world politics”(cited, Sutch & Elias, p.45). Arguably, the thematic of more powerful states dictating international policy upon less powerful states does seem to be a normal phenomenon in the realms of global politics.
The
consequence of stronger States acting
for their ‘self-interest’ may bring distrust within the Kyoto
Protocol. This is especially true, when it is quite evidential that action of
each State engaged in the Kyoto Protocol is placing its’ own interest before
any other. With states such as China and other developed nations being able to
decide their own levels of greenhouse emitted. This in turn, places the Kyoto
Protocol, under the provision of being a tool for wealthier nations to become
stronger while displacing developing nations. Although, this may be a cynical
view to take, the fact remains, most of
the new manufacturing nations are both highly inefficient users of energy and power their manufacturing largely with the dirtiest of the major fuels,
coal. The result is higher
emissions. This brings further contention on the sustainability of the Kyoto
Protocol, with Energy economist Dieter Helm from the University of Oxford
asking: "What exactly is the point of reducing emissions in Europe if it
encourages energy-intensive industry to move to China, where the pollution will
be even worse?" (www.newscientist.com).
The
inequality of Power in the Kyoto Protocol could also have far reaching negative
impact. First, other states in effect may feel intimidated by the fact that
other states are controlling the overall policy regime. By feeling intimidates,
would certainly discourage a less able state to get involved with the protocol.
Second, the inequality in power may also cause further tensions between states
and this in turn can affect other bi-lateral policy areas. Third, the policies
that were initially developed may in turn be distilled further, to counter any
thought of unfairness within the agreement itself. Fourth, the balance of power
is constantly changing in international politics, meaning that further friction
is likely.
An example
can be drawn from the formation of the ‘BRIC’ compact, that comprises of
Brazil, Russia, India and China who have formed mutual trading agreements. In
doing so, these countries have bypassed trade agreements imposed by the West (http://www.economywatch.com). The formation of BRIC was a
direct result of western powers trying to manipulate the trade policies within
the World Trade Organisation. In doing
so, it has created a very difficult position when trying to negotiate trade
agreements.
While Hobbes explains the reason
for such inequalities in global politics is mainly due to no overall global
authority. The idea of any ‘global authority’ seems a far fetch dream, even if
the UN is considered to be acting in such manner. The UN, also falls short of
acting autonomously in the interest of every State, and also shows similar
disparity in power between stronger and weaker states (Doyle, 2011). Although,
it would be premature to think the UN is acting as some kind of global regime
to enforce the Kyoto protocol. Instead the UN appears to be acting as the
‘depositary’ organisation hosting the Kyoto protocol (www.unfccc.int). The UN’s
capacity to enforce agreements on other nations appears to be incapacitated.
Instead it would appear that economic power of a nation super-seeds the legal
underpinning of any agreement or decision. Even the governance structure of the
United Nations, appears to exercise the same hierarchy pattern as seen in the
Kyoto Protocol.
However, the power hierarchy system does not appear to prevent other nations from being part of the Kyoto Protocol or the United Nations. This would suggest, other factors obviously play an important role in influencing nations to join agreement. Professor Keohane, from the realist school of thought, outlines three distinct reasons that nations benefit from joining a voluntary or international organisation. The first, by joining an international organisation, a nation is able to share and gather information on various mutually beneficial areas, such as intelligence on trade. Second, by joining the nation receives incentives and trade concessions. And finally, resolving disputes that may have otherwise not been possible to be resolved (Joffe, 2007). This would imply even though, what may initially appear to be unfair to less prominent States from the peripherals, the benefits from an agreement such as the Kyoto protocol, applies to all states.
Realists place
the reason for states being habituated for power due to the very architecture
of the way a state is set up. The concept of ‘sovereignty’ is defined by
Morgantheu, as how effectively a state can operate in an international context
with the primary goal of meeting its’ own interest (Morgenthau & Thompson,
1985). This in turn, seems to encourage the idea that each state should have
it’s own authority, as the state is accountable to it’s own public. This would
suggest the very underpinning of State governance is in part responsible for
the ‘self interest’ attitude experienced within a global context. As Hetcher (2000:15) explains, the State is
acting in the interest of its constitutional gate-keeper, the electoral (Rourke
2005, p104). In this respect, what the electoral demands dictates significantly
in the way a State behaves in relation to the Kyoto Protocol. Furthermore, in context of the electoral, the
realists also believe people possess a ‘inherently dark side’, and this will
always mean that self interest will be the starting point of any agreement
(Rourke p17, cited Spegele, 1996;).
While it can be learnt from the Realist
Perspective, there are many different dynamics to State power and has a push
and pull effect on any internationally related matter. The Kyoto Protocol
certainly illustrates States do have a certain degree of autonomous power in
how far they endorse the Kyoto Protocol.
In many cases it shows how economic strength and military strength such
as the USA, can bring huge amounts of leverage in the way a state dictate the
overall conclusion of an international agreement such as the Kyoto protocol.
Furthermore,
a key question can be drawn through the Realist perspective, and that is
whether the Kyoto agreement is a sustainable or best way to tackle global
warming? If indeed the states dictate their own interests, and power is the
instrument that dictates the direction of the Kyoto agreement. Worst still, it appears
to bring to light, a certain amount of doubt on the level of success by the
Kyoto Protocol in terms of meeting its objectives. Evidence would suggest,
these doubtful claims are becoming reality, as CO2 monitoring stations in Hawaii have discovered the concentration of
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has passed 400 parts per million (ppm); levels
not seen in several million years (http://oilprice.com).
However, Morgenthau
(1948) belief of the State having ‘principle authority’ is not completely
realistic. As certain States do not have such privileges, due to stronger
States imposing restrictions on their movements – in this sense the Realists
perspective appears to be too simplistic for the Kyoto Protocol in labelling a
State to be the ‘principle’ decision maker. Morgenthau idea of the State
being the principle decision is further flawed, if the electorate are the
gatekeepers to the movement of the state, then surely it would seem sensible to
gain a better understanding would be through a deeper understanding of the
population. This in turn would provide a better understanding the way the State
is behaving and might behave in the future.
Furthermore,
Hobbes statement almost provides a ‘precursor’ for more powerful states to
behave in such manner, as he is almost accepting this behaviour as the norm and
therefore it is somehow justifiable. Although Hobbes statement maybe a general
consensus within international agreements, a clear distinction needs to be made
with the Kyoto protocol and cannot be viewed under the normal rules of just
another global agreement. The failure of the protocol has a global impact upon
all States. It has been recognised that climate change does have correlation in
causing conflict and mutating a state into a volatile environment (Herd, p.88).
The Realists
perspective argues that by eliminating the moral and jurisprudence underpinning
when considering the behaviour of a state, can provide a better understanding
of global politics (Joffe, 2007). This may be true from most international
political settings, however, by not accepting the moral arguments, provides an
acceptance for States to act in immoral manner as it is considered something
normal, therefore it should almost be accepted. By not considering the moral
argument for China or India not being able to reduce that amount by Japan for
example, it would be a reasonable argument that China and India are the fastest
growing economies and due to their growth, their demand for high emitting CO2
energy is for their self-interest. However, only by considering the moral justification,
such as, the large population of China in comparison to Japan, means the
country is unable to meet those levels. In this sense, if power and self-interest
is used as a analysis tool, it provides a double edged sword argument, and both
sides (i.e China, India v. Japan) can be justified for their behaviour, with no
real solution to the debate. This may be one of reasons the Realist perspective
fails to provide an alternative to the existing set up of Global politics.
While it quite clearly indicates the potential issues surrounding the Kyoto
Protocol through the core principles of power, there appears to be no
distinction between a complete hostile state rather than a state being
difficult. The USA within the Kyoto agreement is not bound to any agreement,
however it is still providing funding and leverage to ensure the agreement is
being pursued. The senior advisors on
the UN panel regarding climate change have facilities based in the USA.
Therefore, it cannot be labelled as being self interested to a point of greed.
Instead it would appear the USA is employing a different approach to the
problem of global warming.
India for
example will not take on binding emission reduction commitment as it considers
it morally wrong to agree to reduce, “when 40% of Indians do not have access to
electricity”(Herd, 2010, p.93). The big
population in emerging economies makes it different from many developed nations
– hence China is unable to be as energy efficient to Japan. Thus a deeper
understanding is required to make a fair assessment of the States behavior and
the moral justification plays just as important role in understanding as power
relationship between states.
Whilst there are debates about the opinions and
history of the Realists theory, and many critics from the liberal wing, would
denote Realists as a failing idea. The Kyoto Protocol is more than a political
ideology, and the author of this paper would argue to effectively tackle Global
Warming through the protocol requires a pragmatic approach. The winning
argument for the protocol is a moral one, and it should be strongly presented
by those wishing to make a success of the agreement. Unfortunately, the
Realists analysis provides a pessimistic view, even though it may be close to
the truth, it is not an option anymore to push aside Global Warming, and by
providing such negative analysis certainly provides fuel to the pessimist
table. Although it should be noted that
any theory is working from agreed set of rules, and this is not true of the
realities of international politics. Therefore theories need to be put aside,
and instead States need to observe a mutual understanding that Global Warming
is happening and needs to be tackled, with every state taking responsibility in
whatever capacity it can within its boundaries. The Kyoto protocol should act
as a framework or a vision rather than the principle agreement to tackle Global
Warming. By each State acting independently, it is able to fulfill is
responsibilities to its Electoral, while the Kyoto Protocol enables a global
vision.
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